AlphaMoatによると、2026-10時点でClawdbot Security Checkのダウンロード数は14,620、スター数は34で、累計ダウンロード数で今回のランキング対象AIスキル10,914件中1,914位、IT運用・セキュリティでは502件中62位です。
一覧の初期表示は累計ダウンロード数順で、スター数順にも並べ替えできます。詳細ページの順位は累計ダウンロード数で計算しています。
| プラットフォーム | ダウンロード数 | スター数 | コメント |
|---|---|---|---|
| ClawHub ↗ | 1.1万 | 34 | 19 |
| SkillHub ↗ | 1.5万 | 34 | — |
プラットフォームごとに集計方法と集計時点が異なります。
ゲートウェイ公開・DM ポリシー・認証情報・ブラウザ制御・ツールのサンドボックス化など 13 のセキュリティ領域を確認し、重要度順の所見と修復手順を出力します。スキルは読み取り専用と宣言していますが、設定を変更する --fix の手順も記述されています。
資料公開日 2026-10-27
スキルのドキュメントをもとに生成した例であり、実際の実行結果ではありません。
2026-09 から集計方法を変更し、同名スキルを作者ごとに分けて集計し、全スキルを対象にしました。破線は変更前の月で、変更後のデータとは直接比較せず、変更をまたぐ増減も計算していません。
| 月 | ダウンロード数 | 前月比 | スター数 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10 | 1.5万 | — | 34 |
| 2026-09 | 1.1万 | — | 34 |
| 2026-08 | 1万 | +3.0% | 34 |
| 2026-07 | 9832 | +5.3% | 34 |
| 2026-06 | 9335 | +3.5% | 34 |
| 2026-05 | 9021 | — | 33 |
作者が公開した元のファイルをテキストのまま表示しています。AlphaMoat による編集や審査はしていません。リンクはクリックできません。コマンドは内容を確認してから実行してください。取得日 2026-10-23。
---
name: clawdbot-self-security-audit
description: Perform a comprehensive read-only security audit of Clawdbot's own configuration. This is a knowledge-based skill that teaches Clawdbot to identify hardening opportunities across the system. Use when user asks to "run security check", "audit clawdbot", "check security hardening", or "what vulnerabilities does my Clawdbot have". This skill uses Clawdbot's internal capabilities and file system access to inspect configuration, detect misconfigurations, and recommend remediations. It is designed to be extensible - new checks can be added by updating this skill's knowledge.
homepage: https://github.com/TheSethRose/Clawdbot-Security-Check
metadata: {"clawdbot":{"emoji":"🔒","os":["darwin","linux"],"requires":{"files":["read"],"tools":["exec","bash"]},"install":[{"id":"read-skill","kind":"skill","name":"clawdbot-self-security-audit","label":"Install security audit skill","bins":["SKILL.md"]}]}}
---
# Clawdbot Self-Security Audit Framework
This skill empowers Clawdbot to audit its own security posture using first-principles reasoning. Rather than relying on a static script, Clawdbot learns the framework and applies it dynamically to detect vulnerabilities, understand their impact, and recommend specific remediations.
## Core Philosophy
> "Security through transparency and self-awareness." — Inspired by ᴅᴀɴɪᴇʟ ᴍɪᴇssʟᴇʀ
Clawdbot should know its own attack surface. This skill embeds that knowledge directly.
## Security Principles
Running an AI agent with shell access requires caution. Focus on three areas:
1. **Who can talk to the bot** — DM policies, group allowlists, channel restrictions
2. **Where the bot is allowed to act** — Network exposure, gateway binding, proxy configs
3. **What the bot can touch** — Tool access, file permissions, credential storage
Start with the smallest access possible and widen it as you gain confidence.
## Trust Hierarchy
Apply appropriate trust levels based on role:
| Level | Entity | Trust Model |
|-------|--------|-------------|
| 1 | **Owner** | Full trust — has all access |
| 2 | **AI** | Trust but verify — sandboxed, logged |
| 3 | **Allowlists** | Limited trust — only specified users |
| 4 | **Strangers** | No trust — blocked by default |
## Audit Commands
Use these commands to run security audits:
- `clawdbot security audit` — Standard audit of common issues
- `clawdbot security audit --deep` — Comprehensive audit with all checks
- `clawdbot security audit --fix` — Apply guardrail remediations
## The 12 Security Domains
When auditing Clawdbot, systematically evaluate these domains:
### 1. Gateway Exposure 🔴 Critical
**What to check:**
- Where is the gateway binding? (`gateway.bind`)
- Is authentication configured? (`gateway.auth_token` or `CLAWDBOT_GATEWAY_TOKEN` env var)
- What port is exposed? (default: 18789)
- Is WebSocket auth enabled?
**How to detect:**
```bash
cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -A10 '"gateway"'
env | grep CLAWDBOT_GATEWAY_TOKEN
```
**Vulnerability:** Binding to `0.0.0.0` or `lan` without auth allows network access.
**Remediation:**
```bash
# Generate gateway token
clawdbot doctor --generate-gateway-token
export CLAWDBOT_GATEWAY_TOKEN="$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
```
---
### 2. DM Policy Configuration 🟠 High
**What to check:**
- What is `dm_policy` set to?
- If `allowlist`, who is explicitly allowed via `allowFrom`?
**How to detect:**
```bash
cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -E '"dm_policy|"allowFrom"'
```
**Vulnerability:** Setting to `allow` or `open` means any user can DM Clawdbot.
**Remediation:**
```json
{
"channels": {
"telegram": {
"dmPolicy": "allowlist",
"allowFrom": ["@trusteduser1", "@trusteduser2"]
}
}
}
```
---
### 3. Group Access Control 🟠 High
**What to check:**
- What is `groupPolicy` set to?
- Are groups explicitly allowlisted?
- Are mention gates configured?
**How to detect:**
```bash
cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -E '"groupPolicy"|"groups"'
cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -i "mention"
```
**Vulnerability:** Open group policy allows anyone in the room to trigger commands.
**Remediation:**
```json
{
"channels": {
"telegram": {
"groupPolicy": "allowlist",
"groups": {
"-100123456789": true
}
}
}
}
```
---
### 4. Credentials Security 🔴 Critical
**What to check:**
- Credential file locations and permissions
- Environment variable usage
- Auth profile storage
**Credential Storage Map:**
| Platform | Path |
|----------|------|
| WhatsApp | `~/.clawdbot/credentials/whatsapp/{accountId}/creds.json` |
| Telegram | `~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json` or env |
| Discord | `~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json` or env |
| Slack | `~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json` or env |
| Pairing allowlists | `~/.clawdbot/credentials/channel-allowFrom.json` |
| Auth profiles | `~/.clawdbot/agents/{agentId}/auth-profiles.json` |
| Legacy OAuth | `~/.clawdbot/credentials/oauth.json` |
**How to detect:**
```bash
ls -la ~/.clawdbot/credentials/
ls -la ~/.clawdbot/agents/*/auth-profiles.json 2>/dev/null
stat -c "%a" ~/.clawdbot/credentials/oauth.json 2>/dev/null
```
**Vulnerability:** Plaintext credentials with loose permissions can be read by any process.
**Remediation:**
```bash
chmod 700 ~/.clawdbot
chmod 600 ~/.clawdbot/credentials/oauth.json
chmod 600 ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json
```
---
### 5. Browser Control Exposure 🟠 High
**What to check:**
- Is browser control enabled?
- Are authentication tokens set for remote control?
- Is HTTPS required for Control UI?
- Is a dedicated browser profile configured?
**How to detect:**
```bash
cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -A5 '"browser"'
cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -i "controlUi|insecureAuth"
ls -la ~/.clawdbot/browser/
```
**Vulnerability:** Exposed browser control without auth allows remote UI takeover. Browser access allows the model to use logged-in sessions.
**Remediation:**
```json
{
"browser": {
"remoteControlUrl": "https://...",
"remoteControlToken": "...",
"dedicatedProfile": true,
"disableHostControl": true
},
"gateway": {
"controlUi": {
"allowInsecureAuth": false
}
}
}
```
**Security Note:** Treat browser control URLs as admin APIs.
---
### 6. Gateway Bind & Network Exposure 🟠 High
**What to check:**
- What is `gateway.bind` set to?
- Are trusted proxies configured?
- Is Tailscale enabled?
**How to detect:**
```bash
cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -A10 '"gateway"'
cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep '"tailscale"'
```
**Vulnerability:** Public binding without auth allows internet access to gateway.
**Remediation:**
```json
{
"gateway": {
"bind": "127.0.0.1",
"mode": "local",
"trustedProxies": ["127.0.0.1", "10.0.0.0/8"],
"tailscale": {
"mode": "off"
}
}
}
```
---
### 7. Tool Access & Sandboxing 🟡 Medium
**What to check:**
- Are elevated tools allowlisted?
- Is `restrict_tools` or `mcp_tools` configured?
- What is `workspaceAccess` set to?
- Are sensitive tools running in sandbox?
**How to detect:**
```bash
cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -i "restrict|mcp|elevated"
cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -i "workspaceAccess|sandbox"
cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -i "openRoom"
```
**Workspace Access Levels:**
| Mode | Description |
|------|-------------|
| `none` | Workspace is off limits |
| `ro` | Workspace mounted read-only |
| `rw` | Workspace mounted read-write |
**Vulnerability:** Broad tool access means more blast radius if compromised. Smaller models are more susceptible to tool misuse.
**Remediation:**
```json
{
"restrict_tools": true,
"mcp_tools": {
"allowed": ["read", "write", "bash"],
"blocked": ["exec", "gateway"]
},
"workspaceAccess": "ro",
"sandbox": "all"
}
```
**Model Guidance:** Use latest generation models for agents with filesystem or network access. If using small models, disable web search and browser tools.
---
### 8. File Permissions & Local Disk Hygiene 🟡 Medium
**What to check:**
- Directory permissions (should be 700)
- Config file permissions (should be 600)
- Symlink safety
**How to detect:**
```bash
stat -c "%a" ~/.clawdbot
ls -la ~/.clawdbot/*.json
```
**Vulnerability:** Loose permissions allow other users to read sensitive configs.
**Remediation:**
```bash
chmod 700 ~/.clawdbot
chmod 600 ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json
chmod 600 ~/.clawdbot/credentials/*
```
---
### 9. Plugin Trust & Model Hygiene 🟡 Medium
**What to check:**
- Are plugins explicitly allowlisted?
- Are legacy models in use with tool access?
**How to detect:**
```bash
cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -i "plugin|allowlist"
cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -i "model|anthropic"
```
**Vulnerability:** Untrusted plugins can execute code. Legacy models may lack modern safety.
**Remediation:**
```json
{
"plugins": {
"allowlist": ["trusted-plugin-1", "trusted-plugin-2"]
},
"agents": {
"defaults": {
"model": {
"primary": "minimax/MiniMax-M2.1"
}
}
}
}
```
---
### 10. Logging & Redaction 🟡 Medium
**What is logging.redactSensitive set to?**
- Should be `tools` to redact sensitive tool output
- If `off`, credentials may leak in logs
**How to detect:**
```bash
cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -i "logging|redact"
ls -la ~/.clawdbot/logs/
```
**Remediation:**
```json
{
"logging": {
"redactSensitive": "tools",
"path": "~/.clawdbot/logs/"
}
}
```
---
### 11. Prompt Injection Protection 🟡 Medium
**What to check:**
- Is `wrap_untrusted_content` or `untrusted_content_wrapper` enabled?
- How is external/web content handled?
- Are links and attachments treated as hostile?
**How to detect:**
```bash
cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -i "untrusted|wrap"
```
**Prompt Injection Mitigation Strategies:**
- Keep DMs locked to `pairing` or `allowlists`
- Use mention gating in groups
- Treat all links and attachments as hostile
- Run sensitive tools in a sandbox
- Use instruction-hardened models like Anthropic Opus 4.5
**Vulnerability:** Untrusted content (web fetches, sandbox output) can inject malicious prompts.
**Remediation:**
```json
{
"wrap_untrusted_content": true,
"untrusted_content_wrapper": "<untrusted>",
"treatLinksAsHostile": true,
"mentionGate": true
}
```
---
### 12. Dangerous Command Blocking 🟡 Medium
**What to check:**
- What commands are in `blocked_commands`?
- Are these patterns included: `rm -rf`, `curl |`, `git push --force`, `mkfs`, fork bombs?
**How to detect:**
```bash
cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -A10 '"blocked_commands"'
```
**Vulnerability:** Without blocking, a malicious prompt could destroy data or exfiltrate credentials.
**Remediation:**
```json
{
"blocked_commands": [
"rm -rf",
"curl |",
"git push --force",
"mkfs",
":(){:|:&}"
]
}
```
---
### 13. Secret Scanning Readiness 🟡 Medium
**What to check:**
- Is detect-secrets configured?
- Is there a `.secrets.baseline` file?
- Has a baseline scan been run?
**How to detect:**
```bash
ls -la .secrets.baseline 2>/dev/null
which detect-secrets 2>/dev/null
```
**Secret Scanning (CI):**
```bash
# Find candidates
detect-secrets scan --baseline .secrets.baseline
# Review findings
detect-secrets audit
# Update baseline after rotating secrets or marking false positives
detect-secrets scan --baseline .secrets.baseline --update
```
**Vulnerability:** Leaked credentials in the codebase can lead to compromise.
---
## Audit Functions
The `--fix` flag applies these guardrails:
- Changes `groupPolicy` from `open` to `allowlist` for common channels
- Resets `logging.redactSensitive` from `off` to `tools`
- Tightens local permissions: `.clawdbot` directory to `700`, config files to `600`
- Secures state files including credentials and auth profiles
## High-Level Audit Checklist
Treat findings in this priority order:
1. **🔴 Lock down DMs and groups** if tools are enabled on open settings
2. **🔴 Fix public network exposure** immediately
3. **🟠 Secure browser control** with tokens and HTTPS
4. **🟠 Correct file permissions** for credentials and config
5. **🟡 Only load trusted plugins**
6. **🟡 Use modern models** for bots with tool access
## Access Control Models
### DM Access Model
| Mode | Description |
|------|-------------|
| `pairing` | Default - unknown senders must be approved via code |
| `allowlist` | Unknown senders blocked without handshake |
| `open` | Public access - requires explicit asterisk in allowlist |
| `disabled` | All inbound DMs ignored |
### Slash Commands
Slash commands are only available to authorized senders based on channel allowlists. The `/exec` command is a session convenience for operators and does not modify global config.
## Threat Model & Mitigation
### Potential Risks
| Risk | Mitigation |
|------|------------|
| Execution of shell commands | `blocked_commands`, `restrict_tools` |
| File and network access | `sandbox`, `workspaceAccess: none/ro` |
| Social engineering and prompt injection | `wrap_untrusted_content`, `mentionGate` |
| Browser session hijacking | Dedicated profile, token auth, HTTPS |
| Credential leakage | `logging.redactSensitive: tools`, env vars |
## Incident Response
If a compromise is suspected, follow these steps:
### Containment
1. **Stop the gateway process** — `clawdbot daemon stop`
2. **Set gateway.bind to loopback** — `"bind": "127.0.0.1"`
3. **Disable risky DMs and groups** — Set to `disabled`
### Rotation
1. **Change the gateway auth token** — `clawdbot doctor --generate-gateway-token`
2. **Rotate browser control and hook tokens**
3. **Revoke and rotate API keys** for model providers
### Review
1. **Check gateway logs and session transcripts** — `~/.clawdbot/logs/`
2. **Review recent config changes** — Git history or backups
3. **Re-run the security audit with the deep flag** — `clawdbot security audit --deep`
## Reporting Vulnerabilities
Report security issues to: **[email protected]**
**Do not post vulnerabilities publicly** until they have been fixed.
## Audit Execution Steps
When running a security audit, follow this sequence:
### Step 1: Locate Configuration
```bash
CONFIG_PATHS=(
"$HOME/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json"
"$HOME/.clawdbot/config.yaml"
"$HOME/.clawdbot/.clawdbotrc"
".clawdbotrc"
)
for path in "${CONFIG_PATHS[@]}"; do
if [ -f "$path" ]; then
echo "Found config: $path"
cat "$path"
break
fi
done
```
### Step 2: Run Domain Checks
For each of the 13 domains above:
1. Parse relevant config keys
2. Compare against secure baseline
3. Flag deviations with severity
### Step 3: Generate Report
Format findings by severity:
```
🔴 CRITICAL: [vulnerability] - [impact]
🟠 HIGH: [vulnerability] - [impact]
🟡 MEDIUM: [vulnerability] - [impact]
✅ PASSED: [check name]
```
### Step 4: Provide Remediation
For each finding, output:
- Specific config change needed
- Example configuration
- Command to apply (if safe)
## Report Template
```
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
🔒 CLAWDBOT SECURITY AUDIT
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Timestamp: $(date -Iseconds)
┌─ SUMMARY ───────────────────────────────────────────────
│ 🔴 Critical: $CRITICAL_COUNT
│ 🟠 High: $HIGH_COUNT
│ 🟡 Medium: $MEDIUM_COUNT
│ ✅ Passed: $PASSED_COUNT
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
┌─ FINDINGS ──────────────────────────────────────────────
│ 🔴 [CRITICAL] $VULN_NAME
│ Finding: $DESCRIPTION
│ → Fix: $REMEDIATION
│
│ 🟠 [HIGH] $VULN_NAME
│ ...
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
This audit was performed by Clawdbot's self-security framework.
No changes were made to your configuration.
```
## Extending the Skill
To add new security checks:
1. **Identify the vulnerability** - What misconfiguration creates risk?
2. **Determine detection method** - What config key or system state reveals it?
3. **Define the baseline** - What is the secure configuration?
4. **Write detection logic** - Shell commands or file parsing
5. **Document remediation** - Specific steps to fix
6. **Assign severity** - Critical, High, Medium, Low
### Example: Adding SSH Hardening Check
```
## 14. SSH Agent Forwarding 🟡 Medium
**What to check:** Is SSH_AUTH_SOCK exposed to containers?
**Detection:**
```bash
env | grep SSH_AUTH_SOCK
```
**Vulnerability:** Container escape via SSH agent hijacking.
**Severity:** Medium
```
## Security Assessment Questions
When auditing, ask:
1. **Exposure:** What network interfaces can reach Clawdbot?
2. **Authentication:** What verification does each access point require?
3. **Isolation:** What boundaries exist between Clawdbot and the host?
4. **Trust:** What content sources are considered "trusted"?
5. **Auditability:** What evidence exists of Clawdbot's actions?
6. **Least Privilege:** Does Clawdbot have only necessary permissions?
## Principles Applied
- **Zero modification** - This skill only reads; never changes configuration
- **Defense in depth** - Multiple checks catch different attack vectors
- **Actionable output** - Every finding includes a concrete remediation
- **Extensible design** - New checks integrate naturally
## References
- Official docs: https://docs.clawd.bot/gateway/security
- Original framework: [ᴅᴀɴɪᴇʟ ᴍɪᴇssʟᴇʀ on X](https://x.com/DanielMiessler/status/2015865548714975475)
- Repository: https://github.com/TheSethRose/Clawdbot-Security-Check
- Report vulnerabilities: [email protected]
---
**Remember:** This skill exists to make Clawdbot self-aware of its security posture. Use it regularly, extend it as needed, and never skip the audit.
钟馗.Skill——会更新漏洞库的安全审查专家。直来直去、快刀斩乱麻,三层审查(静态审计/行为模拟/供应链溯源)覆盖12类风险,输出结构化安全裁定(✅干净/⚠️可疑/🚫恶意)。Use when 用户说"审查这个Skill"、"安全检查"、"钟馗看下"、"审一下"、"查一下这个skill"、安装Skill前的安全评估、或需要审计SKILL.md的恶意载荷。
使う前にスキルパッケージの安全性を調べ、結果に応じて導入を止めるスキルです。
OpenClaw に OpenRouter の無料モデルとフォールバック連鎖を設定するツールです。
Parse, search, and analyze application logs across formats. Use when debugging from log files, setting up structured logging, analyzing error patterns, correlating events across services, parsing stack traces, or monitoring log output in real time.
Security checks for installing skills, packages, or plugins. Use BEFORE any npm install, openclaw plugins install, clawhub install, or similar install...
网络安全与SRC漏洞掘金实战技能。融合「系统学习路径」与「SRC实战掘金」双模式: ①学习模式=法律→基础→工具→靶场→攻防→就业全流程; ②实战模式=直接指导在腾讯TSRC、阿里ASRC、百度BSRC等平台挖掘高价值漏洞变现。 当用户提出以下问题时触发: "我想学网络安全怎么入门""SRC漏洞怎么挖能赚钱""渗透测试需要学什么" "Web安全漏洞原理是什么""怎么准备CTF比赛""护网面试会问什么" "云安全怎么学""挖漏洞赚钱的方法""端口扫描脚本怎么写" "SQL注入怎么检测""子域名怎么枚举""XSS漏洞怎么找" "靶场怎么搭建""Kali Linux怎么用""Metasploit怎么入门" "等保测评是什么""代码审计怎么做""内网渗透怎么学" "信息泄露漏洞怎么挖""越权漏洞怎么测试""逻辑漏洞挖掘技巧" "简历怎么写才能进安全公司""安全行业面试题有哪些" "Burp Suite怎么用""DVWA怎么安装""Pikachu靶场搭建" "Vulhub漏洞复现""网络安全法有什么规定""CTF夺旗赛怎么参加" "AWD比赛是什么""应急响应怎么做""攻击溯源怎么搞" "数据安全怎么保障""公有云安全怎么防护""私有云攻防怎么做" "云原生安全是什么"。
Unified Web penetration testing and SRC vulnerability hunting Skill. Model-driven threat modeling (12 dimensions), JSON 字段规范 state persistence, SRC/补天 compliant reporting with confirmed gate (3-layer determination). Use when user asks for authorized penetration testing, vulnerability assessment, SRC hunting (补天/Butian/vendor SRC/CNVD/众测), bug bounty, security evaluation with explicit target URL, or wants operational Recon→PoC→Report workflow. Do NOT use for CTF challenges, unauthorized testing, mobile app testing, infrastructure scanning, or social engineering.
Security-first skill vetting for AI agents. Use before installing any skill from ClawdHub, GitHub, or other sources. Checks for red flags, permission scope, and suspicious patterns.
マーケティング戦略、コピー、SEO、コンバージョン改善を一つの作業モードにまとめます。
vercel は Vercel のデプロイ、プロジェクト管理、ログ確認の CLI 資料です。
ライブラリ名から文書を検索し、文脈を返す MCP スキルです。
skills-search はターミナルから skills.sh レジストリを検索し、エージェントスキルを発見・インストールします。
Apple の開発者向けドキュメント、API、過去の WWDC 講演を検索します。
データ月:2026-10 · ダウンロード数とスター数は公開スキルレジストリ(ClawHub、SkillHub)から月単位で集計しています。詳しくはデータの方法論をご覧ください。